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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH JO·NES
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
HORMAN'S INC., a Utah corporation, ALLEN STEEL COMPANY
J Utah corporation, JO·HN DOE
and RICHARD RO£,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
9956

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
HORMAN'S INC.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Horman's Inc. generally agrees with the
statement of facts set forth in plaintiff's brief. May we,
however, state certain procedural matters to afford a
clear understanding of the holding of the trial court.
Defendants Horman's Inc. and Allen Steel Company
each filed motions for summary judgment noticed for
hearing at the pretrial of this action. (R 29, 3 0, 31)
Counsel for defendants argued their respective motions
for summary judgment at the pretrial held on May 8,
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1963. Portions of the depositions of the plaintiff and her

husband Julius Jones were read to the pretrial judge. The
judge requested that counsel file memorandums setting
forth the facts and the law so he would be fully advised on
the matter. The court also granted plaintiff's motion to
amend her complaint.
D.efendant Allen Steel Company filed its memorandum of authorities on May 10, 1963 (R 57 to 62) The
memorandum contained a ((statement of facts" and an
argument on the law. Defendant Horman's, Inc. filed its
memorandum on May 13, 1963. (R 52 to 56) This memorandum also contained a complete statement of facts
and the applicable law.
On May 20, 1963, plaintiff's attorney filed a reply
to the memorandums of Horman's· Inc. and Allen Steel
Company. (R 64 to 67) In the memorandum plaintiff's
attorney made the following statement:
FACTS
nFor the purpose of argument in connection
with the motions for summary judgment made by
said defendants herein, plaintiff accepts as substantially correct the statement of facts set forth
in each said memorandum." (Italics ours)
Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on May 20,
1963. (R 36-37) Defendant Horman's Inc. filed a supplemental memorandum on May 22, 1963. (R 38 to 40)
Subsequently, on June 3, 1963, an order was entered
granting the motions for summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. (R 43)
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Plaintiff has adopted as her statement of facts on
this appeal the statement of facts contained in the defendant's memorandums. (Appellant's Brief Page 3).

ARGUMENT

THE RECORD CO~NTAINS A STATEMENT Of
FACTS ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES WHICH ENABLES THE COURT TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES
PRESENTED.
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 384 P. 2d
109, (Utah 1963) and Schubach v. Wagner, 3 84 P. 2d
110, (Utah 1963) the Supreme Court reversed summary
judgments because there was nothing in the record which
enabled the court to determine the issues presented.
In the instant case both defendants submitted statements of fact in their memorandums. The plaintiff's
attorney accepted this statement of facts as substantially
correct. Plaintiff's statement of facts in its brief is apparently taken from the statement of facts in the memorandum filed by defendant Horman's Inc. There is no
dispute as to the facts in this case. The trial court had
before it an agreed statement of the facts, at the time· it
ruled on the motions for summary judgment. This court
has the facts before it as contained in the memorandums.
Plaintiff cannot complain that the depositions of the
plaintiff and her husband were not published or introduced in evidence. The only purpose this could serve
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would be to get the facts into the record. Inasmuch as the
appellant agreed to defendants' statement of the facts in
the memorandums, the facts are P'art of the record in the
case by stipulation.
.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
· (( (c) :~o * * The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving. party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."' * * :~o (Italics ours)
In the instant case there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the trial court held the defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It would appear to be a useless act to require the
parties to publish the depositions and the court to read
the depositions when the P'arties agreed to the facts. It
is the statement of facts accepted by all parties which
forms the basis for the summary judgment.
In Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty
Insurance Underwriters Inc. 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. Zd
135 (Utah 1963) this court affirmed a summary judgment when the depositions had not been published or
presented to the trial court. Here the plaintiff's business
was damaged because of fire. It claimed to have been
coerced into accepting an insufficient sum from the defendant under the loss of business coverage. The Supreme
Court concluded there was nothing in the record justifying
such accusation. The summary judgment was affirmed.
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Four depositions were urged for examination by the
Supreme Court. Two were in the record, two were not,
none of which had been published or presented to the
trial court. The court said it could not consider matters
not in the record before the trial court.
· Although the depositions had not been published, the
court found the record complete enough t_o determine the
issues presented.
In the instant case the state of the record enables the
court to determine the issues presented. The facts are
uncontroverted. This court has before it a succinct
statement of the facts. _This stipulation of facts obviates
the publishing of the deposition.
At the pretrial in the instant case plaintiff's attorney
requested permission to amend her complaint. The· request was granted. Plaintiff filed her amended complaint
on May 20, 1963. The amended complaint contained the
additional allegation of res ipsa loquitur. The amended
complaint was before the trial court when it granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment. The order
was not entered until June 3, 1963. The trial court held
that theallegation of res ipsa loquitur in addition to negligence did not significantly alter the plaintiff's claim and
defendants were entitled to a summary judgment.

POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF'S STATUS WAS NO GREATER
THAN THAT OF A LICENSEE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
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On the evening of March 27, 1962, Julius Jones
asked his wife, the plaintiff, if she would walk to the Town
House Athletic Club with him to see cchow near the steel
was up." No on~ from Horman's Inc. or Allen· Steel Company asked Julius ]ornes or the plamtiff to go to the Town
House Athletic Club. Mr. Hoffine, a masonry contractor, told Julius Jones on the morning of March 27, 1962
that as soon as the steel w:as up in the Town House Athletic
Club, Ij:o~fine woul_4 probably be able to use Jones on the
job. On the same day, plaintiff's husband observed the
steel beams being unloaded from a truck.
,
It is clear from the record that Mr. Hoffine, the
masonry contractor, did not ask J~lius Jones to go to the
job site. Jones saw the steel being unloaded from a truck
on the day of the ac.cident. He knew the steel was not up
~ because it had just been unloaded. The statement by Hoffine that he would probably be able to use Jones when the
steel was up cannot be said to extend an implied invitation
to Jones to go on the job site to inspect the premises in the
evening when he had already been there the same day.
There was no invitation, direct or implied, for Julius Jones
or his wife to go on the premises. Julius Jones and his wife
were both trespassers as· that term has been defined by the
courts.

ccA trespasser is a person who enters the
premises of another without license, invitation or
other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose
of his own, or at his convenience, or merely as an
idler with no apparent purpose other than perhaps
to satisfy his curiosity." 38 Am. Jur. p. 771 Sec.
109.
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In In Re Wimmers Estafr 111 Utah 444, 182 P. 2d
119, (Utah 1947) this court defined trespasser as follows:

ccA trespasser is defined as a person who enters
or remains upon land in the possession of another
without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise."
Jones' act of going upon the property of the Town
House Athletic Club on the evening of March 27, 1962,
was certainly at his own convenience. He had no license,
invitation or other right from any person to enter the
premises. He was acting as nan idler with no apparent
purpose other than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity." He
knew the steel was not up because he had seen it unloaded
from a truck that saine day.
The duty owed to a trespasser is stated in 3 8 Am.
Jur. p. 771 Sec. 109:

uAn owner owes trespassers no duty to keep
the premises in a safe condition for their use, and
as a general rule, he is not held responsible for an
injury sustained by a trespasser upon the premises
from a defect therein."
It is obvious that the defendants are not liable to the
plaintiff in her status as a trespasser.
Assuming, as the plaintiff contends, that there was
an implied invitation to the plaintiff's husband to go to
the job site on the evening to see how near the steel was
up, his status would only be elevated to that of a ((licensee"
rather than a ((trespasser."
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This court has defined the term cclicensee" as follows:
((A licensee is defined as a person who is
p7ivileged to enter or ;emain upon the land by
VIrtue of· the possessor s consent, whether given
by invitation or permission." See In Re Wimmers
·Estate Supra. ·
Plaintiff's husband went to the T qwn House Athletic
Club to see ((how near the steel was up." He did not go
to obtain employment. The only purpos·e of his visit to the
premises, if a,ny, was to gain knowledge so he could ask
for employment from Mr. Hoffine, the masonry contractor. The purpose of his trip was solely for his oivn· benefit.
Plaintiff's husband was not there for the benefit of the
defendants, nor in any matter connected with defendants
business.
The courts have generally held that a person seeking
employment on the premises of another is a licensee and
not an invitee.
In Leach v. Inman 12 S.E. 2d 103, plaintiff brought
action against the owner of a building for personal injuries received when he fell down a stairway. Plaintiff
alleged that he was in the building for the purpose of securing. employment from one of the tenants in the building.
The Court held that in the· absence of any allegation that
the defendant was guilty of wilful or wanton negligence,
the complaint was demurrable and would be dismissed.
The Court said:
((A licensee is a person who is neither a customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does
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not stand in any contractual relation with the
owner of the premises, and who is permitted expressly or impliedly to go thereon merely for his
own interest, convenience or gratification; The
owner of such premises is liable to a licensee only
for wilful or wanton injury."

In Rohdes v. ]. R. Watkins f5 Co., 65 SW 2d 1098, a
woman who was seeking employment was held to be a
uliccnsee" and not an ((invitee." The plaintiff, when
seeking employment was told to return at a later date.
When the plaintiff returned she fell down the stairway
after being refused employment. The Court held:
ccwe do not think that she sustained the relation of either an express or an implied invitee
to the premises. We think that she was a licensee
only. She was there on her own business seeking
employment. She was not there for the benefit of
the defendant, nor in any matter connected with
defendant's business. She was not there in the
capacity of a customer. Her only purpose in
being there was to seek employment. The mere
fact that when she had called on one or more
previous occasions and was told that they could
not give her employment at that time, but could
probably use her at some future time, did not
create the relation of an invitee to the premises.
Sherman and Redfield on Negligence ( 6 Ed.) Sec.
706, thus defines an implied invitation:
((Invitation by the owner or occupant is implied by law, where the person going on the
premises does so in the interest or for the benefit,
real or supposed, of such owner or occupant, or in
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the matter of mutual interest, or in the usual
course of business, or where the person injured was
present in the performance of some duty, official
or otherwise."
In Bird v. Cloverleaf-Harris Dairy, 102 Utah 330,
125 P. 2d 797 (Utah 1942) this court held that an invitee
became a licensee when he parked his father's automobile
in an unauthorized area adjacent to the defendant's
creamery plant. The automobile was damaged when a
canopy and part of the wall of the building collapsed.
The low,er court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The
question on appeal was whether the parking of the automobile under the canopy changed the status of the one
who pa,rked it from that of an invitee to that of a licensee.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded
the case with directions to enter a judgment of no cause
of action. The court held the plaintiff's son, so far as
parking the car was concerned, was a me,re licensee and
took the premises as he found them.
As stated, in the Bird case supra, the courts unanimously hold a licensee takes the premises as he :finds
them and that an owner owes no duty to a licensee except
not to harm him wilfully or wantonly.
{{It has been stated that an owner or occupant
owes one whom he permits to enter for the latter's
convenience, no duty except not to harm him
wilfully or wantonly, or to set traps for him, or
to expose him to danger recklessly or wantonly."
38 Am. Jur. p. 765, Sec. 104.
Plaintiff accompanied her husband to the Town
House Athletic Club for social purposes only. She had no
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reason whatsoever to be on the premises. She was on the

job site because her husband had asked her to go with

him - not because of any implied invitation from the
defendants.
In a number of cases the courts have held a wife to
be a cclicensee" when she accompanied her husband to his

place of employment.
In Hogan v. Hess Construction Company 358 P. 2d
755 (Kansas 1961) the Supreme Court of Kansas held a
wife was a licensee when she accompanied he·r husband
to his place of employment for the purpose of being
with him and assisting him in his work. Plaintiff's husband, in the course of his employment, had to move some
stacks of sheetrock. Plaintiff in an attempt to assist her
husband, began to move the sheetrock when they toppled
over and pinned her to the floor. Inasmuch as there was
no allegation of wilfull or intentional conduct on behalf
of the defendant, a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition was
sustained.
The Court stated:
uAt the time in question, the husband had as
much right to be on the premises as he would have
as a general employee of the defendant. As to the
plaintiff's wife, it appears that she was neither the
employee of the defendant nor the employee of
Bob's Service Center, and that she was in fact the
invitee or guest of her husband upon the premises.
She came along with him on the Labor Day holiday
for mutual companionship and to help him in his
work in any way in which she could assist him."
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The Court relied on the decision of Backman v. Vickers Petroleum Co., 357 P. 2d 748 (Kansas, 1960) where
the Court held a wife, who drove the family auto to the
husband's place of business and slipped on some ice on the
parking lot, was a guest of her husband but only a licensee
of the employer of her husband.
In Scbmidt v. Langer, et al 83 N.E. 2d 35 (Illinois
1948) the court held a wife was a (tlicensee" when she
accompanied her husband to an apartment building to
repair boilers. The wife went for a social visit with her
sister who was a co-owner of the apartment. The wife was
injured when she fell down a stairway at the rear of the
apartment building. A directed verdict for the defendants
was affirmed on appeal.
, Plaintiff cites the case of Brigman v. Fiske-Carter
Construction Co. 136 S.E. 125 (North Carolina 1926)
as authority for her contention that she was an ((implied
invitee." The Brigman tase is not in point because there
the defendant was guilty of active negligence, to wit:
backing a truck into plaintiff's parked automobile. Mrs.
Brigman was sitting in the car at the time it was struck
by defendant's truck. The courts statement that Mrs.
Brigman was an invitee was dicta because the courts
generally hold that a licensee may recover from an owner
or occupant of the land if that person is guilty of active
negligence.
There is no evidence in the instant case of any active
negligence. The plaintiff claims the steel beams tipped
over while she
sitting next to them. In the absence

was
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of any claim of active negligence, the Brigman cas~ is not
in point.
The other authorities cited by plaintiff to support
her contention that she is entitled to the same status of
her husband involve situations where the customer is on
the premises to transact business or at the express request
of the property owner. The facts in the instant case do
not fall into that category.
At the time of this accident, the Town House
Athletic Club was not open to any patrons. There was no
express or implied invitation for the plaintiff or her husband to visit the premises. They were there of their own
volition and must take the premises as· they found them.
A realistic evaluation of the facts in this record conclusively show the plaintiff's st~tus was no greater than
that of a licensee. It is respectfully submitted that she
was a trespasser and this defendant cannot be held responsible for the in juries sustained by her. If the couit
considers the plaintiff a licensee, she is still not entitled to
recover because there is absolutely no evidence of any
wilfull or wanton conduct on behalf of Horman's Inc.
POINT III
AS A MATTER OF LAW THIS DEFENDANT
DID NOT WILFULLY OR WANTONLY INJURE
THE PLAINTIFF NOR DID IT KNOW OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON THE PREMISES.
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The steel girders were delivered to the job site by
Allen Steel Company. The girders were set on edge in
a driveway dug down to the foundation of the building
so equipment could be taken out of the basement. The
girders were about 80 feet long; two to two and a half
feet wide at the ends and about five feet wide at the
center. The girders were mostly in the driveway but the
ends were sticking up out of the driveway. There was
a 2 x 12 bolted to the top of the girders and they were
held together by a 1 x 4 nailed across the top.
In Wood v. Wood 8 Utah 2d 279, 333 P. 2d 630 this
court held that where the plaintiff's status was that of a
guest licensee, defendant's duty toward her was to re£rain
from wilfull injuries and from permitting conditions to
exist which might be considered as traps. In the Wood
case the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when she fell
down a stairwell in the garage portion of the defendant's
home. The lower court directed a verdict and the Supreme
Court affirme.d on the ground that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

In the instant case it is obvious that defendants did
not wilfully injure the plaintiff. The steel girders were
set on edge in a driveway where they were plainly visible,
and in no way obstructed f.rom view. They cannot, by
any stretch of the imagination, be characterized as cctraps."
In Wood v. Wood this court adopted the rule stated
in Sec. 342 of the Restatement of Torts with respect to
the duty of a landowner to a licensee for known dangerous
conditions.
ttA possessor of land is subject to liability for
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bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that
it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has
reason to believe that they will not discover the
condition or realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain
upon the land, without exercising reasonable care
(i) To make the condition reasonably safe, or
(ii) To warn them of the risk involved."
The rule is predicated on the proposition that the
landowner knows of the condition and realizes it involves
an unreasonable ·risk of harm, and also has reason to believe that the person invited or permitted on the premises
will not discover the condition or realize the risk. There
is no evidence in this record that defendants should have
realized that the steel girders placed on edge in the driveway constituted a dangerous condition. The defendants
had no more reason to suspect the steel girders would
tip over than the plaintiff and her husband. The plaintiffs husband had undoubtedly been around construction
areas before and did not see anything unusual about the
way in which the girders had been placed in the driveway
for he placed a building block on the ground adjacent to
the girders for his wife to sit on. If he thought the girders
constituted an unreasonable risk he certainly would not
have invited his wife to sit next to them. It is evident
the defendant did not expect the steel girders to tip over
nor did the plaintiff or her husband.
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This defendant respectfully submits that as a matter
of law this defendant had no reason. to believe that the
placement and location of the steel girders constituted
an unreasonable risk of harm to a person it did not invite
or permit on the premises.

This court has held that it is elementary that a plaintiff cannot recover unless she can show that the defendant
was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of her injury. Mortensen v. First Security Bank of
Utah, 12 Utah 2d 89, 363 P. 2d 75 (Utah 1961). An
examination of this record shows that this defendant was
not negligent.
The plaintiff's status can be no greater than that of a
licensee. This defendant earnestly contends that plaintiff
was a trespasser at the time she was injured. Even if she
reached the dignity of a licensee, she cannot recover because there is no evidence of any wilfull injury by this
defendant nor did this defendant know that the placement
of the steel girders in the driveway constituted an unreasonable risk of harm.
The summary judgment entered by the lower court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
Horman's, Inc.
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